The Impact of India and Pakistan’s Accession (Enlargement) on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Abstract

India and Pakistan joined the SCO as member states in June 2017 at the summit in Astana, turning the organization into an eight-sided grouping, now including, besides Russia, China and four Central Asian states, two states of South Asia. It marked the first membership enlargement of the SCO since its founding in 2001. Various opinions and assessments are expressed regarding the admission of New Delhi and Islamabad to the ranks of the organization, which in general boil down to the complexity of interaction, decision-making process, coordination of common positions and prompt response to regional and global political developments. Furthermore, enlargement is weighed down by long-standing conflict relations between India and Pakistan, India and China. This thesis is aimed to analyze the impact and consequences of enlargement on the distribution of power within the SCO. It is assumed that the SCO enlargement, especially India’s accession relatively balances power relations within the framework of the organization. Although, it does not mean parity between Beijing and Moscow since China is the driving engine in the SCO. For twenty years within the SCO the states of Central Asia, China and Russia have accumulated a certain experience of interaction with its ups and downs. Today the SCO is seen by China as a platform for advancing its Belt and Road Initiative, whereas Russia mostly perceives the SCO as a geopolitical grouping. China is rapidly increasing its presence in the region, having established itself as the main economic force and source of investment in the Central Asian states and at the same time gradually making attempts to gain momentum in the political sphere. For Russia, India is one of the strategic partners and, what is not less important in light of China’s growing economic power and common borders with three Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), India can play a balancing role. As for the states of the region, they are still looking at China with caution and are not ready for Beijing to become the main political partner in Central Asia, therefore choosing a strategy of maneuvering between major powers.